Abstract-Server-assisted signature plays an important role in all kinds of applications in electronic commerce. It can be applied to the settings where a user employs public network servers to help her execute digital signature operations. In this paper, we discuss a problem of how to construct forward secure single-server, multi-server and thresholdserver assisted signature schemes using Bellare-Miner Scheme and propose three signature schemes. In the singleserver assisted signature scheme, the user (signer) can employ a server to help her produce a signature. In the multi-server assisted scheme, the number of employed servers is increased to n, therefore, it is infeasible for an attacker to forge a valid signature if she can't corrupt all servers and the signer. In the threshold-server assisted signature scheme, the generation of a valid signature needs the cooperation of the user and a quorum of servers. The scheme is more robust because the system can still get the correct signature as soon as no more than threshold servers are corrupted. These three schemes maintain the forward secure property, that is, even if the current secret key is exposed, an adaptive chosen-message adversary can't forge any signature pertaining to previous time period. Finally, we prove the proposed schemes are correct and forward secure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures as fundamental and useful building blocks of security protocols have wide applications in all kinds of electronic systems. Digital signature can provide a way for a user to sign documents so that the signatures can be verified by everyone. In a signature scheme, the user holds a secret (signing) key, while the public key is published so that everyone can know it. The user uses the secret key to create a signature for a message, but anyone can verify the validity of the signature using the corresponding public key. A digital signature provides three essential security services: authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation. However, if the secret key to create the signature is stolen, then all the signatures pertaining to this secret key will not be trustworthy any more even if the signatures are created before the secret key is stolen. It is a very serious issue for some important applications such as Certificate Authority (CA) and electronic bank.
Forward secure signature is a solution to mitigate the damage of secret key leaks. The total time is divided into multiple time periods, and the different secret keys are used in different time periods while the public key remains fixed. Each new secret key is computed from the previous one via a one-way key update algorithm. Therefore, the compromise of one secret key in a certain period does not affect the security of the signatures signed in previous periods. Server-assisted signature is another effective signature to protect the security of the secret key. The secret key is shared between a user (signer) and a server, so it needs to compromise the user and the server simultaneously for an attacker to forge a valid signature.
Forward security for digital signature was firstly proposed by Anderson in an invited lecture of the 4th ACM conference on computer and communications security [1] . Bellare and Miner [2] formalized the forward secure signature and gave the first practical scheme. And then a sequence of forward secure signature schemes [3~6] with different merits were put forwards. Malkin et al. [7] proposed a forward secure signature scheme in which the operations of all sub-algorithms are independent of the total time periods T but liner to the current time period. How to construct a forward secure signature scheme with higher efficiency has been a hot topic in research for a long time [8] . Bilinear pairings advocated by Boneh and Franklin [9] could be used to construct forward secure signature schemes [12, 13, 14] . A fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme was proposed in [15] , which allowed the signer to specify which signatures of the current time period remain valid when revoking the public key. Forward secure signature schemes in untrusted update environments were researched in [16, 17] . Forward secure threshold signature was also considered in [18~21] .
A server-assisted signature was proposed by Xu et al. [22] . In their proposal, the signing key is shared among several servers and a user. The signing generation needs the cooperation of the user and a quorum number of servers. It is specially useful when a user employs several public network servers to help her execute threshold signature. Yang et al. [23] presented a proactive secret sharing for server assisted threshold signatures. Their scheme has higher security property, the proactive security. The paper [24] introduced an server assisted one-time signature alternative to server assisted signature scheme. The paper [25] revisited server assisted computation for digital signatures.
In this paper, we discuss a problem of how to construct forward secure single-server, multi-server and thresholdserver assisted signature scheme using Bellare-Miner scheme. We construct three schemes with different properties. In the first scheme, the system is composed of one user and one server that share the secret key together. The user can employ the server to help her to produce a signature. The user and the server must cooperate to produce a valid signature. In the second scheme, the number of employed servers is increased to n, therefore, the signer must combine all n servers to produce a valid signature. It is infeasible for an attacker to forge a signature if she can't corrupt all servers and the user. In the last scheme, any generation of a valid signature needs the cooperation of the user and a quorum of servers. The scheme is more robust because the system can still get the correct signature as soon as no more than threshold servers are corrupted. The three schemes all maintain the forward secure property, that is, even if the current secret key is exposed, an adaptive chosen-message adversary can't forge any signature pertaining to previous time period. At last, the correctness and security have been analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the preliminaries of our work including some definitions and robustness sub-protocols. The detailed description of schemes is given in Section 3. We analyze the correctness and forward security in section 4. Finally, we conclude this paper in the last section.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Definitions
Below we give the definition of forward secure serverassisted signature. Forward secure server-assisted signature consists of a key generation algorithm, a key update algorithm, a signing algorithm and a verifying algorithm. It satisfies that an adversary can't forge a signature of some new message for some previous period even if she gets the current private key. SAFSS.SIG: the signing algorithm, inputs the current time period j and a message M, and the user and all servers jointly generate a signature <j, tag> of M for period j.
SAFSS.VER: the verification algorithm, inputs the public key PK, a message M and a signature <j, tag>， and returns 1 if <j, tag> is a valid signature of M or 0, otherwise.
If <j, tag> is a valid signature generated in algorithm SAFSS.SIG，then SAFSS.VER(M, <j, tag>)=1.
When the number of servers is 1, we call this scheme as forward secure single-server assisted signature. When the number of servers is over 1, we call this scheme as forward secure multiple-server assisted signature.
Definition 2 (Forward Secure Threshold-Server Assisted Signature).
A forward secure threshold-server assisted signature is an quadruple of algorithms,
SAFSTS=(SAFSTS.GEN, SAFSTS.UPD, SAFSTS.SIG, SAFSTS.VER)
, where t-1 is the maximum number of corrupted servers; n is the total number of servers.
SAFSTS.GEN: the key generation algorithm, inputs a security parameter k N ∈ and the total number of time periods T, and generates a public key PK, the initial share SAFSTS.SIG: the signing algorithm, inputs the current time period j and a message M, and the user and the set of threshold servers B(|B|=t) jointly generate a signature <j, tag> of M for period j.
SAFSTS.VER: the verification algorithm, inputs the public key PK, a message M and a signature <j, tag>， and returns 1 if <j, tag> is a valid signature of M or 0, otherwise.
If <j, tag> is a valid signature generated in algorithm SAFSTS.SIG, then SAFSTS.VER(M, <j, tag>)=1.
B. The Robustness Sub-Protocols
(1) Uncond-Secure-Z N -VSS: In this protocol, the shares of a secret are distributed to a group of players by a (t, n) secret sharing scheme in Z N . It is information-theoretical secure and can tolerate (n-1)/2 malicious players. This protocol is taken from [26, 27] .
The dealer selects two random polynomials in Z N :
secretly. Compute and broadcast the commits , ( {0,..., })
. . When player j receives the message, she checks the validity of the share using the equation
i i j j s k and generates the complaint against player i. Suppose that the honest players constitute the set A. Note that all honest players get the same set A. The player i computes her share ( ) mod
In this protocol, compute the shares of the multiplication of two shared secrets in Z N . At the same time, the exponent of the new polynomial doesn't increase (still t). This protocol combines the approaches in [28] and [32] . Each player i computes the following message: 
Each player i executes DL-VSS protocol [29] to share 
All players employ VSPS-Check [32] protocol to check the validity of the share for player i. Player i proves The proposed forward secure single-server assisted signature is composed by one user and one server. There are four algorithms: algorithm SAFSS.GEN, algorithm SAFSS.UPD, algorithm SAFSS.SIG, algorithm SAFSS.VER. These algorithms are described as follows:
Firstly, select two random and distinct k/2-bit primes 1 2 , p p satisfying:
The dealer selects random values ( , , 0, ,..., )
The user selects random value
and broadcasts
Server generates a random value
computes and broadcasts Below we introduce the second scheme. Different from the first scheme, the number of employed servers is increased to n. Therefore, the scheme has higher security than the first scheme because any adversary unable to corrupt the users and all n servers can't forge any valid signature. Even though she corrupts the user and all servers in a special time point, she can't forge any signature pertaining to previous time period.
1. Algorithm SAFSS.GEN(k,l,n,T). Begin Firstly, select two random and distinct k/2-bit primes 1 2 , p p satisfying:
The dealer selects random value The third scheme is forward secure threshold-Server assisted signature scheme. This scheme is more robust because the dishonest behaviors of fewer than threshold servers don't affect the generation of valid signature. It is specially useful in the circumstance where the servers are easy to be attacked.
Algorithm SAFSTS.GEN(k,l,n,T).
Begin
The dealer selects random value 
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
We only give the correctness and security analysis of the forward secure multi-server assisted signature and forward secure threshold-server assisted signature. The analysis of forward secure single-server assisted signature scheme is very easy because it can be viewed as a special instance of the forward secure multi-server assisted signature scheme when n=1. Thus, 
( ) mod
T j U U Y R N + − = ,( 1 )H j Y M σ = ， mod U s Y Y Y N = ⋅ ,( 1 )
T j U U Y R N + − = ,( 1 )
Thus, 
The security of our schemes base on the security of Bellare-Miner Scheme and Abdalla scheme [14] , which in turn relies on the hardness of factoring.
Theorem 3 (Security of SAFSS) Assuming that the problem of factoring Blum-Williams integer is computationally intractable, it is computationally infeasible to break the forward security of our forward secure multi-server assisted signature.
Proof.
Let F be an adversary to attack the security of our scheme. F works in three phases: the chosen-message attack phase; the corrupt phase; and the forgery phase. Let FTSIG be the multiplicative secret sharing threshold signature scheme in [19] . We want to construct an algorithm I against the security of FTSIG using F as a subroutine. I works in three stages: the chosen-message attack phase; the break-in phase; and the forgery phase,
We can set 1 { ,..., , } n P server server user = and let t n = ,
( 1, 2,..., ) . Then our scheme is a FTSIG(t,t+1, t+1, t+1) scheme for the group of players P. Because the views of adversary in FSIG.key, FSIG.update, and FSIG.sign can all be simulated, the views of adversary in SAFSS.GEN, SAFSS.UPD, and SAFSS.SIG can all be simulated in our scheme, too. Therefore, when I works in the chosen-message attack phase, we set F come to its chosen-message attack phase. When I works in break-in phase, we set F come to its corrupt phase and provide the corrupted private key to I. When I works in forge phase to forge a new signature, F can come to its forge phase to provide the same forgery. Because FTSIG scheme is forward secure assuming factoring is hard, therefore, our scheme is secure forward. It means the adversary cannot forge any signature of previous time period, when she gets the shares of the user and all servers in a time period.
Theorem 4 (Security of SAFSTS) Assuming that the problem of factoring Blum-Williams integer is computationally intractable, it is computationally infeasible to break the forward security of our forward secure threshold-server assisted signature.
There is an adversary attacks the security of BMSIG scheme if our scheme can be attacked by an algorithm. Because BMSIG scheme is forward secure assuming factoring is hard. Therefore, our scheme is forward secure in the random oracle under the same assumption. Here we skip the detailed proof of this theorem.
V CONCLUSIONS
We discuss a problem of how to construct forward secure single-server, multi-server and threshold-server assisted signature schemes using Bellare-Miner Scheme and propose three signature schemes in this paper. The first is single-server assisted scheme, the second is multiserver assisted scheme and the last is threshold-server assisted scheme. These schemes are all based on the Bellare-Miner forward secure signature Scheme. We also analyze the correctness and security. The extended abstract has appeared in International Symposium on Electronic Commerce 2008 [30] .
